Recommendations — cell-level intervention ROI
The ROI chain (how to read this page)
The five findings establish a chain that closes here. Stated reason for not voting (Finding 4) and stated reason for not registering (Finding 3) identify the barrier; revealed method preference (Finding 5) shows which delivery channels the cohort already uses when available; state availability of those channels (Finding 6) determines where the gap is structural rather than behavioral; the gap-closing effect of expanding a channel is the quantity funders and administrators are buying; cost per marginal voter is the unit price.
Across 13 federal general elections (2000-2024), youth 18-29 registered-non-voters cite logistical barriers about 50% of the time, engagement about 24%, and access about 9%. This shifts intervention weight toward policy reform and administrative flexibility interventions and away from brand-awareness GOTV.
Cell-level evidence caveat
The intervention catalog records effect ranges at the population level, with a documented youth multiplier where the primary source publishes one. It does not contain race × gender × age cell-specific effect sizes for most interventions. Where a youth multiplier exists, we use it; where it does not, we report the general-population range and flag "general youth 18-29 — cell-level effect not separately published." This is a genuine limitation of the evidence base, not a gap in this analysis. Finding 5 pairs this catalog with CPS-revealed cell-level method preference to narrow the applicable cell; the catalog alone cannot.
Recommendations matrix
Policy reform (state-level; multi-cycle compounding)
| Intervention | Cell targeting | Barrier | Effect (pp) | Per marginal voter | Evidence | Best-fit funders |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Same-day registration | General youth 18-29 (multiplier 1.2×) | access + logistical | 3.0-5.0 | $0-$5 amortized | strong | Brennan, Pew, Democracy Fund, Hewlett, SoS offices |
| Automatic voter registration | General youth (1.1×) | access | 2.0-4.0 | $0-$5 | moderate | Brennan, Democracy Fund, EAC HAVA, SoS |
| Pre-registration at 16-17 | General youth (1.5×) | access + habit formation | 1.0-3.0 | $0-$5 | moderate | CIRCLE, Knight, Democracy Fund, SoS, AmeriCorps |
| No-excuse absentee voting | General youth (1.1×) | logistical | 2.0-4.0 | $0-$5 | strong | Brennan, Pew, SoS, EAC HAVA |
| Universal vote-by-mail | Low-propensity generally (1.2×) | logistical | 2.0-5.0 | $0-$5 | strong | Democracy Fund, Pew, CO/CA SoS, Knight |
Caveat: these are statute-level changes; per-vote cost amortizes once passed. Initial passage campaign costs are borne separately and not reflected above. Pre-registration carries a multi-cycle lag; it does not deliver near-term gap closure.
Administrative improvement (election-office-level)
| Intervention | Cell targeting | Barrier | Effect (pp) | Per marginal voter | Evidence | Best-fit funders |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Online voter registration | General youth (1.3×) | access | 0.5-2.0 | $5-$15 | moderate | EAC HAVA, Pew, SoS offices |
| Student-ID acceptance at polls | Students 18-24 (2.5×) | access | 0.5-1.5 | — | moderate | Campaign Legal, CIRCLE, SoS |
| Polling-place siting optimization | General youth (1.4×) | logistical | 0.3-1.0 | — | moderate | EAC HAVA, Pew, SoS |
| Ballot tracking portal | General youth (1.1×) | logistical + trust | 0.2-0.7 | — | weak-moderate | EAC HAVA, Pew, SoS |
Caveat: effects are marginal where baseline administration is already strong. Value is often in confidence and equity-of-access, not net turnout.
Programmatic GOTV (campaign-cycle; per-contact costs)
| Intervention | Cell targeting | Barrier | Effect (pp) | Per contact | Per marginal voter | Evidence | Best-fit funders |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Door-to-door canvassing | General youth (1.8× — highest youth multiplier) | engagement + logistical | 0.5-2.0 | $2-$10 | $20-$50 | strong | Alliance for Youth Action, State Voices (c4), Arnold (eval) |
| Peer-to-peer SMS | General youth (2.0×) | engagement | 0.5-1.5 | $0.05-$0.20 | $40-$100 | strong | Alliance for Youth Action, Knight (tools), CIRCLE (eval) |
| Relational organizing | General youth (2.2× — highest overall) | engagement | 1.0-3.0 | $0.50-$2 | $20-$80 | strong | Skoll, Alliance for Youth Action, State Voices (c4) |
| Professional phone banking | General youth (1.2×) | engagement | 0.3-1.0 | $1-$3 | $100-$500 | strong | Arnold (eval), State Voices (c4) |
| Direct mail | General youth (1.1×) | engagement | 0.2-1.0 | $0.50-$1.50 | $100-$500 | strong | State Voices, Way to Win (c4) |
| Targeted digital ads | General youth (1.5×) | engagement | 0.3-1.5 | $0.01-$0.10 | $30-$300 | moderate | Knight, Democracy Fund (tools), Arnold (eval) |
Caveat: effects depend on genuine peer relationship (SMS, relational); do not substitute broadcast for peer-sent. 501(c)(3) partners must scope door-to-door and phone banking as civic education, not electioneering. Field capacity is finite; scaling past local density produces diminishing returns.
Civic infrastructure (multi-cycle, long-lag)
| Intervention | Cell targeting | Barrier | Effect (pp) | Per marginal voter | Evidence | Best-fit funders |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Civics education reform | General youth (3.0×), 5-15 yr lag | engagement (long-term) | 1.0-3.0 | — | weak-moderate | CIRCLE, Knight, Hewlett, AmeriCorps, Russell Sage |
| Service programs (AmeriCorps etc.) | Program participants (2.5×) | engagement (identity) | 1.0-2.0 | — | moderate | AmeriCorps, Skoll, Russell Sage |
Caveat: documented on program alumni; cannot generalize to non-participating youth. Long lag precludes attribution to any near-term cycle.
Institutional reform (structural; multi-cycle compounding)
| Intervention | Cell targeting | Barrier | Effect (pp) | Per marginal voter | Evidence | Best-fit funders |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Independent redistricting commission | General youth (1.4× via efficacy) | structural | 2.0-4.0 | $1-$10 amortized | moderate | Brennan, Campaign Legal, Rockefeller Brothers, Democracy Fund |
| Ranked-choice voting | General youth (1.3×) | structural | 0.5-2.0 | — | weak-moderate | Democracy Fund, Arnold, Rockefeller Brothers |
Caveat: governance/competitiveness framing only; partisan consequences out of scope. RCV general-election effect smaller than primary-election effect.
What not to fund
| Intervention | Effect (pp) | Evidence | Why it fails |
|---|---|---|---|
| Celebrity "go vote" campaigns | 0.0-0.2 | very weak | Salience does not convert to behavior in disengaged youth populations (Gerber & Green 2019 synthesis). |
| Untargeted digital ads | 0.0-0.3 | weak | Cost per marginal voter in the thousands once measured rigorously (Broockman & Kalla 2020). |
| Broadcast SMS without peer | 0.0-0.3 | weak | Effect disappears when peer sender is removed — mechanism is relationship, not channel (Malhotra et al. 2011). |
| "Rock-the-vote" brand awareness | 0.0-0.3 | very weak | Indistinguishable from noise in meta-analytic review. |
If these are funded for other reasons (brand-building, organizational sustainability, fundraising), that rationale should be stated explicitly rather than claimed as voter mobilization.
Funder-fit matrix
22 funders × 6 intervention categories. C = category fit; P = partial fit; blank = out of category. NP column: Y = fully nonpartisan 501(c)(3); L = nonpartisan with positions; M = mixed structure; N = 501(c)(4) / electoral vehicle.
| Funder | NP | Policy | Admin | GOTV | Civic infra | Institutional | Research |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Knight Foundation | Y | P | C | P | C | ||
| Hewlett | Y | C | P | P | C | ||
| Democracy Fund | Y | C | P | C | P | C | |
| Arnold Ventures | Y | C | P | P | P | C | |
| Skoll | Y | P | C | P | |||
| Rockefeller Brothers | Y | C | P | C | P | ||
| Brennan Center | Y | C | C | P | C | C | |
| Pew Charitable Trusts | Y | C | C | P | C | ||
| Campaign Legal Center | Y | C | C | ||||
| Common Cause | L | P | P | C | |||
| State Voices | N | C | |||||
| Way to Win | N | C | |||||
| Arabella network | M | P | P | P | P | P | P |
| AmeriCorps (federal) | Y | C | |||||
| EAC HAVA Grants | Y | P | C | ||||
| California SoS | Y | C | C | P | |||
| Colorado Department of State | Y | C | C | ||||
| NSF Political Science | Y | C | |||||
| Russell Sage | Y | P | P | C | |||
| CIRCLE at Tufts | Y | P | C | C | |||
| Alliance for Youth Action | M | C | P |
Seventeen of twenty-two are 501(c)(3)-compatible. State Voices, Way to Win, Arabella network, Alliance for Youth Action, and some modes of Common Cause are 501(c)(4) or mixed — they appear in the matrix because they fund the correct category, not because they are partnership candidates for a 501(c)(3) deliverable. Government entities (AmeriCorps, EAC, California SoS, Colorado SoS, NSF) require procurement-compatible scoping with distinct disclosure requirements.
How to read this page alongside the findings
- Finding 3 answers which access barrier is cited by which cell; this page says what closes it.
- Finding 4 answers which logistical barrier is cited by which cell; this page says what closes it.
- Finding 5 is the connective tissue: revealed cell-level method preference determines whether an intervention applies to that cell.
- Finding 6 tells you which states already have the lever in place; the intervention rows here tell you the expected effect where it is expanded.
- Finding 7 is the institutional-reform section of the same logic, with within-state pre/post identification pending for Sprint 5.
If a row in this matrix does not trace back to a cell-level finding via one of those pages, treat it as general-population evidence and flag it in the grant narrative. The trust-but-verify rule applies here too.
data/external/evidence_roi/intervention_effect_size_catalog.csv. Funder landscape from Candid.org, foundation websites, and ProPublica Nonprofit Explorer; full list at data/external/evidence_roi/funder_landscape.csv. Every row traces to a named row in those two files. Full provenance: methodology page.