Youth Voter Turnout in America Data from CIRCLE at Tufts, U.S. Census CPS, and state election offices

Recommendations — cell-level intervention ROI

This page converts the diagnostic findings into a defensible allocation menu. Every row is phrased the same way: intervention X for cell Y has effect-range Z at cost-range W; evidence quality V; what it cannot do is U. No advocacy verbs, no point estimates, no invented cell-level evidence.

The ROI chain (how to read this page)

The five findings establish a chain that closes here. Stated reason for not voting (Finding 4) and stated reason for not registering (Finding 3) identify the barrier; revealed method preference (Finding 5) shows which delivery channels the cohort already uses when available; state availability of those channels (Finding 6) determines where the gap is structural rather than behavioral; the gap-closing effect of expanding a channel is the quantity funders and administrators are buying; cost per marginal voter is the unit price.

Across 13 federal general elections (2000-2024), youth 18-29 registered-non-voters cite logistical barriers about 50% of the time, engagement about 24%, and access about 9%. This shifts intervention weight toward policy reform and administrative flexibility interventions and away from brand-awareness GOTV.

Cell-level evidence caveat

The intervention catalog records effect ranges at the population level, with a documented youth multiplier where the primary source publishes one. It does not contain race × gender × age cell-specific effect sizes for most interventions. Where a youth multiplier exists, we use it; where it does not, we report the general-population range and flag "general youth 18-29 — cell-level effect not separately published." This is a genuine limitation of the evidence base, not a gap in this analysis. Finding 5 pairs this catalog with CPS-revealed cell-level method preference to narrow the applicable cell; the catalog alone cannot.


Recommendations matrix

Policy reform (state-level; multi-cycle compounding)

Intervention Cell targeting Barrier Effect (pp) Per marginal voter Evidence Best-fit funders
Same-day registration General youth 18-29 (multiplier 1.2×) access + logistical 3.0-5.0 $0-$5 amortized strong Brennan, Pew, Democracy Fund, Hewlett, SoS offices
Automatic voter registration General youth (1.1×) access 2.0-4.0 $0-$5 moderate Brennan, Democracy Fund, EAC HAVA, SoS
Pre-registration at 16-17 General youth (1.5×) access + habit formation 1.0-3.0 $0-$5 moderate CIRCLE, Knight, Democracy Fund, SoS, AmeriCorps
No-excuse absentee voting General youth (1.1×) logistical 2.0-4.0 $0-$5 strong Brennan, Pew, SoS, EAC HAVA
Universal vote-by-mail Low-propensity generally (1.2×) logistical 2.0-5.0 $0-$5 strong Democracy Fund, Pew, CO/CA SoS, Knight

Caveat: these are statute-level changes; per-vote cost amortizes once passed. Initial passage campaign costs are borne separately and not reflected above. Pre-registration carries a multi-cycle lag; it does not deliver near-term gap closure.

Administrative improvement (election-office-level)

Intervention Cell targeting Barrier Effect (pp) Per marginal voter Evidence Best-fit funders
Online voter registration General youth (1.3×) access 0.5-2.0 $5-$15 moderate EAC HAVA, Pew, SoS offices
Student-ID acceptance at polls Students 18-24 (2.5×) access 0.5-1.5 moderate Campaign Legal, CIRCLE, SoS
Polling-place siting optimization General youth (1.4×) logistical 0.3-1.0 moderate EAC HAVA, Pew, SoS
Ballot tracking portal General youth (1.1×) logistical + trust 0.2-0.7 weak-moderate EAC HAVA, Pew, SoS

Caveat: effects are marginal where baseline administration is already strong. Value is often in confidence and equity-of-access, not net turnout.

Programmatic GOTV (campaign-cycle; per-contact costs)

Intervention Cell targeting Barrier Effect (pp) Per contact Per marginal voter Evidence Best-fit funders
Door-to-door canvassing General youth (1.8× — highest youth multiplier) engagement + logistical 0.5-2.0 $2-$10 $20-$50 strong Alliance for Youth Action, State Voices (c4), Arnold (eval)
Peer-to-peer SMS General youth (2.0×) engagement 0.5-1.5 $0.05-$0.20 $40-$100 strong Alliance for Youth Action, Knight (tools), CIRCLE (eval)
Relational organizing General youth (2.2× — highest overall) engagement 1.0-3.0 $0.50-$2 $20-$80 strong Skoll, Alliance for Youth Action, State Voices (c4)
Professional phone banking General youth (1.2×) engagement 0.3-1.0 $1-$3 $100-$500 strong Arnold (eval), State Voices (c4)
Direct mail General youth (1.1×) engagement 0.2-1.0 $0.50-$1.50 $100-$500 strong State Voices, Way to Win (c4)
Targeted digital ads General youth (1.5×) engagement 0.3-1.5 $0.01-$0.10 $30-$300 moderate Knight, Democracy Fund (tools), Arnold (eval)

Caveat: effects depend on genuine peer relationship (SMS, relational); do not substitute broadcast for peer-sent. 501(c)(3) partners must scope door-to-door and phone banking as civic education, not electioneering. Field capacity is finite; scaling past local density produces diminishing returns.

Civic infrastructure (multi-cycle, long-lag)

Intervention Cell targeting Barrier Effect (pp) Per marginal voter Evidence Best-fit funders
Civics education reform General youth (3.0×), 5-15 yr lag engagement (long-term) 1.0-3.0 weak-moderate CIRCLE, Knight, Hewlett, AmeriCorps, Russell Sage
Service programs (AmeriCorps etc.) Program participants (2.5×) engagement (identity) 1.0-2.0 moderate AmeriCorps, Skoll, Russell Sage

Caveat: documented on program alumni; cannot generalize to non-participating youth. Long lag precludes attribution to any near-term cycle.

Institutional reform (structural; multi-cycle compounding)

Intervention Cell targeting Barrier Effect (pp) Per marginal voter Evidence Best-fit funders
Independent redistricting commission General youth (1.4× via efficacy) structural 2.0-4.0 $1-$10 amortized moderate Brennan, Campaign Legal, Rockefeller Brothers, Democracy Fund
Ranked-choice voting General youth (1.3×) structural 0.5-2.0 weak-moderate Democracy Fund, Arnold, Rockefeller Brothers

Caveat: governance/competitiveness framing only; partisan consequences out of scope. RCV general-election effect smaller than primary-election effect.


What not to fund

Intervention Effect (pp) Evidence Why it fails
Celebrity "go vote" campaigns 0.0-0.2 very weak Salience does not convert to behavior in disengaged youth populations (Gerber & Green 2019 synthesis).
Untargeted digital ads 0.0-0.3 weak Cost per marginal voter in the thousands once measured rigorously (Broockman & Kalla 2020).
Broadcast SMS without peer 0.0-0.3 weak Effect disappears when peer sender is removed — mechanism is relationship, not channel (Malhotra et al. 2011).
"Rock-the-vote" brand awareness 0.0-0.3 very weak Indistinguishable from noise in meta-analytic review.

If these are funded for other reasons (brand-building, organizational sustainability, fundraising), that rationale should be stated explicitly rather than claimed as voter mobilization.


Funder-fit matrix

22 funders × 6 intervention categories. C = category fit; P = partial fit; blank = out of category. NP column: Y = fully nonpartisan 501(c)(3); L = nonpartisan with positions; M = mixed structure; N = 501(c)(4) / electoral vehicle.

Funder NP Policy Admin GOTV Civic infra Institutional Research
Knight Foundation Y P C P C
Hewlett Y C P P C
Democracy Fund Y C P C P C
Arnold Ventures Y C P P P C
Skoll Y P C P
Rockefeller Brothers Y C P C P
Brennan Center Y C C P C C
Pew Charitable Trusts Y C C P C
Campaign Legal Center Y C C
Common Cause L P P C
State Voices N C
Way to Win N C
Arabella network M P P P P P P
AmeriCorps (federal) Y C
EAC HAVA Grants Y P C
California SoS Y C C P
Colorado Department of State Y C C
NSF Political Science Y C
Russell Sage Y P P C
CIRCLE at Tufts Y P C C
Alliance for Youth Action M C P

Seventeen of twenty-two are 501(c)(3)-compatible. State Voices, Way to Win, Arabella network, Alliance for Youth Action, and some modes of Common Cause are 501(c)(4) or mixed — they appear in the matrix because they fund the correct category, not because they are partnership candidates for a 501(c)(3) deliverable. Government entities (AmeriCorps, EAC, California SoS, Colorado SoS, NSF) require procurement-compatible scoping with distinct disclosure requirements.


How to read this page alongside the findings

If a row in this matrix does not trace back to a cell-level finding via one of those pages, treat it as general-population evidence and flag it in the grant narrative. The trust-but-verify rule applies here too.


Methodology. Effect ranges reflect the low-high bounds published in the source meta-analyses; treat each range as approximately a 95% CI unless the source specifies otherwise. Cost ranges reflect both effect-size uncertainty and per-contact variance. Blank cells mean the catalog does not report that quantity. Primary source: Gerber & Green, Get Out The Vote, 4th ed. (2019), supplemented by Brennan Center cost-benefit analyses, Results for America evidence briefs, and peer-reviewed individual studies cited in data/external/evidence_roi/intervention_effect_size_catalog.csv. Funder landscape from Candid.org, foundation websites, and ProPublica Nonprofit Explorer; full list at data/external/evidence_roi/funder_landscape.csv. Every row traces to a named row in those two files. Full provenance: methodology page.